Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Match Made in Hell by Craig, Robin Kundis
BYU Law Review
Volume 2011 | Issue 6 Article 3
12-18-2011
Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and
Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Match Made
in Hell
Robin Kundis Craig
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robin Kundis Craig, Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Match Made in Hell, 2011 BYU L.
Rev. 1863 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2011/iss6/3
DO NOT DELETE 1/21/2012 10:59 AM 
 
1863 
Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and  
Long-Term Ecological Resilience:  
A Match Made in Hell 
Robin Kundis Craig 
ABSTRACT 
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill that lasted from April to 
September 2010 was not only the worst oil spill disaster in United States 
history, but also the first to occur at great depth. Drilling at great depth 
multiplies the risks and complications of offshore oil extraction. It also, 
as this Article explores, makes natural resource damages a decisively 
inadequate remedy for the injuries done to the Gulf of Mexico’s (the 
“Gulf”) ecosystems, especially the poorly understood but highly 
productive ecosystems that exist almost a mile below the surface. This 
Article argues that our current natural resource damages regimes for 
oil spills depend too heavily on an assumption that ocean areas like the 
Gulf are stably resilient, able to absorb and recover from an incessant 
series of environmental insults ranging from widespread loss of 
wetlands to nutrient pollution and a dead zone to overfishing to 
continual releases of oil. By acknowledging that disasters like the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill could push ecosystems across regime-
shifting thresholds into new states, resilience thinking better captures the 
inherent and unavoidable risks that exploitative activities in the Gulf 
actually pose to the socio-ecological systems that depend on its continued 
productive functioning. As a result, resilience thinking can also suggest 
new and more comprehensive ways of thinking about oil spill liability 
that might bring about the reformations in offshore oil drilling 
regulation that many commentators seek. 
 
 .  Attorneys’ Title Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs, 
Florida State University College of Law, Tallahassee, Florida. My thanks to Professors Lisa 
Grow Sun and Brigham Daniels for inviting me to participate in this symposium, “Disasters 
and the Environment,” held at the J. Reuben Clark School of Law in February 2011. I can be 
reached by email at rcraig@law.fsu.edu. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Deepwater Horizon oil rig was huge, weighing in at 33,000 
tons and supporting four decks of working space and an oil derrick 
that rose another twenty stories above the platform.1 It cost $350 
million to build2 and had arrived at the Macondo lease site on 
January 31, 2010, to drill the Macondo well for British Petroleum 
(“BP”).3 
Less than three months later, “BP and the Macondo well were 
almost six weeks behind schedule and more than $58 million over 
budget.”4 The commercial pressures BP faced as a result of these cost 
overruns likely led it to take shortcuts, and these shortcuts probably 
help to explain why, on the night of April 20, 2010, the Macondo 
well blew out. The well’s explosion engulfed the Deepwater Horizon 
in flames, requiring abandonment of the rig,5 and killed eleven crew 
members.6 The rig itself sank into the depths of the Gulf of Mexico 
(the “Gulf”) two days later, on April 22—Earth Day.7 
In the aftermath of this human tragedy, concerns about the 
environment began to grow. Immediate attempts to trigger the rig’s 
“blowout preventer” failed,8 and “[b]y mid-afternoon on April 23, 
[remotely operated] vehicles discovered that oil was leaking from the 
end of the riser, where it had broken off from the Deepwater Horizon 
when the rig sank.”9 A second leak was discovered the next day, 
leading to the Unified Command’s announcement “that the riser 
was leaking oil at a rate of 1000 barrels per day.”10 The background 
of this estimate remains unclear, although the estimate itself appears 
to have come from BP.11 A few days later, a National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) scientist estimated that the 
 
 1. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE 
DRILLING: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 1 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 BP DISASTER REPORT], 
available at http://tinyurl.com/4j5fy8k.  
 2. See id. at 2. 
 3. See id. at 3. 
 4. Id. at 2. 
 5. See id. at 6–19. 
 6. See id. at 55. 
 7. See id. 
 8. Id. at 131. 
 9. Id. at 132. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. 
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well was releasing about 5000 barrels of oil a day, although, given 
the uncertainties involved in the estimation because of the depth of 
the leak, he also noted that the flow could have been as much as 
10,000 barrels per day.12  
Immediate environmental consequences included surface oil 
slicks, fishery closures,13 contaminated beaches,14 oiled wildlife,15 and 
increasing reports of health problems among spill workers.16 Oil spill 
responders sprayed dispersants on the surface oil for twelve weeks,17 
releasing far more of these toxic chemicals into the environment than 
had been used (even then, controversially) after the 1989 Exxon 
Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska.18 In response to that 
1989 oil spill, responders sprayed a total of about 5500 gallons of 
dispersant, compared to 141,358 gallons sprayed on the Gulf spill 
during the week of April 27 to May 3, and another 168,988 gallons 
the following week.19 Nevertheless, as was true in Alaska, use of 
dispersants in the Gulf was controversial. Although the dispersants 
could reduce coastal and terrestrial impacts, “[l]ess oil on the surface 
means more in the water column, spread over a wider area, 
potentially increasing exposure for marine life.”20 The dispersants 
may even have inhibited the natural biodegradation of oil.21 
After several unsuccessful attempts to stop the oil leaks, BP 
finally succeeded on July 15, 2010, after eighty-seven days of oil 
flowing into the Gulf.22 “Static kill” procedures23 in early August 
helped to finalize the end of the oil spill,24 and BP permanently 
 
 12. See id. at 133. 
 13. See id. at 139–43. 
 14. See Oil Reaches Louisiana Shores, THE BIG PICTURE (May 24, 2010), 
http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2010/05/oil_reaches_louisiana_shores.html. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See OSHA’s Efforts to Protect Workers, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMIN., http://www.osha.gov/oilspills/index.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2011). 
 17.  See 2011 BP DISASTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 143.  
 18. See id. at 144.  
 19. See id.  
 20. Id. at 143. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. at 165. 
 23. The “static kill” procedures involved pumping heavy mud and cement through the 
blowout preventer and into the well to “suffocate” the flow of oil. Adam Gabbatt, BP Oil 
Spill—The Static Kill Explained, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2010, 8:49 AM), 
http://tinyurl.com/7bogsag. 
 24. See 2011 BP DISASTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 167. 
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sealed the Macondo well in September.25 Admiral Thad Allen, head 
of the Unified Command, pronounced the well dead on September 
19, almost exactly five months (152 days) after the blowout 
occurred.26 
According to the National Commission on the BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (“Deepwater Horizon 
Commission”), “[t]he Deepwater Horizon blowout produced the 
largest accidental marine oil spill in U.S. history”27 and “immediately 
threatened a rich, productive marine ecosystem.”28 On August 4, 
2010, the federal government estimated that about 4.9 million 
barrels of oil total had been released into the Gulf, at a rate ranging 
from 62,000 barrels per day in April to 52,700 barrels per day in 
mid-July—a vast increase from the initial estimates.29 While the 
government’s announcement was widely interpreted as concluding 
that 75% of the oil was “gone” from the environment (burned, 
skimmed, directly recovered from the wellhead, or evaporated or 
dissolved),30 NOAA Administrator Jane Lubchenco quickly clarified 
that only about 50% of the oil was “gone”; the rest was considered 
to be degrading naturally.31 
Uncertainties regarding the environmental impacts of the Gulf 
oil spill are many. As the Deepwater Horizon Commission noted, 
“Scientists simply do not yet know how to predict the ecological 
consequences and effects on key species that might result from oil 
exposure in the water column, both far below and near the 
surface.”32 The timing of the oil spill disrupted the reproductive 
cycles of many species, including the oysters that the Gulf is famous 
for. Oysters are a keystone species in the Gulf—that is, “an organism 
that exerts a shaping, disproportionate influence on its habitat and 
community.”33 The spill probably impacted bluefin tuna as well. The 
Gulf is considered part of the bluefin’s “essential fish habitat,”34 and 
 
 25. See id. at 169. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Id. at 173. 
 28. Id. at 174. 
 29. See id. at 167. 
 30. See id. at 167–68. 
 31. See id. at 168 & fig. 5-2. 
 32. Id. at 174. 
 33. Id. at 178. 
 34. Id.; see also Robin Kundis Craig, The Gulf Oil Spill and National Marine 
Sanctuaries, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11074, 11074 (2010) (noting that injuries 
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“the Ocean Foundation estimated that the spill could have affected 
20% of the 2010 season’s population of bluefin tuna larvae, further 
placing at risk an already severely overfished species.”35 Endangered 
species of whales and sea turtles were also impacted by the oil spill: 
wildlife responders collected 1144 sea turtles and 109 marine 
mammals that had been injured by the spill, and many more 
undiscovered injuries of the same types are suspected to have 
occurred.36 
However, what makes the Deepwater Horizon oil spill “special” 
in terms of how we think about environmental risk and 
environmental damage in the United States—and, more broadly, in 
terms of how we think about offshore oil drilling—is the great depth 
at which the spill occurred. Unlike previous oil spills in the Gulf, 
“this one spewed from the depths of the ocean, the bathypelagic 
zone (3300–13,000 feet deep).”37 Importantly, this area, although 
deep and dark, is not a Gulf “dead zone”; instead, the Gulf’s 
bathypelagic zone has “abundant and diverse marine life,” including 
cold-water corals, light-producing fish, sperm whales, and giant 
squid.38 However, the additional risks to the Gulf’s species and 
ecosystems from such deepwater drilling were not—as many 
commentators have made clear—properly considered or regulated.39 
 
to the bluefin tuna could have impacts as far away as the Mediterranean Sea). 
 35. 2011 BP DISASTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 181. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. at 174. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See, e.g., Richard Oliver Brooks, The Gulf Oil Spill: The Road Not Taken, 74 ALB. L. 
REV. 489, 497–507 (2010–2011); Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: 
Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 
TUL. L. REV. 983, 988–99 (2011); Alyson C. Flournoy, Three Meta-Lessons Government and 
Industry Should Learn from the BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster and Why They Will Not, 38 B. 
C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 281, 289–302 (2011); Andrew Hartsig, Shortcomings and Solutions: 
Reforming the Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Framework in the Wake of the Deepwater 
Horizon Disaster, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 269, 299–325 (2011); Peter Jan Honigsberg, 
Conflict of Interest that Led to the Gulf Oil Disaster, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 
10414, 10414–17 (2011); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Learning from Disasters: Twenty-One Years 
After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout Finally 
Address the Systemic Flaws Revealed in Alaska?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11041, 
11042–46 (2010); Jonathan Simon & Jennifer Owen, The Policy and Regulatory Response to 
Deepwater Horizon: Transforming Offshore Oil & Gas Leasing?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 11084, 11084–87 (2010); David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of 
Mexico, Environmental Crime, and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1425–28 
(2011). 
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Moreover, it is not clear that ecological remedies available under 
existing law will ever fully capture the damage done in the BP Gulf 
oil spill, let alone be able to restore the affected areas of the Gulf to 
pre-Deepwater Horizon status.40 The primary remedies available for 
this damage are natural resource damages under the federal Clean 
Water Act (“CWA”)41 and the federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
(“OPA”).42 The federal government and the Gulf states (Texas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida) are currently pursuing 
natural resource damages for the BP oil spill,43 but much remains 
uncertain about what damages they can claim.  
In particular, proper assessment of natural resource damages 
requires the ability to compare a baseline condition for a species, 
habitat, or ecosystem to the postdisaster state.44 With respect to the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, however, baseline conditions for the 
deepwater areas that the spill affected are largely unknown.45 In 
addition, the primary goal of natural resource damages is to restore 
the affected areas to their predisaster state.46 This goal may be 
unattainable in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon spill because 
of the many other stresses afflicting the Gulf,47 particularly given that 
the Gulf’s resilience to such disasters is itself deeply contested. As the 
Deepwater Horizon Commission noted, restoration in the Gulf must 
have a different and “broader” meaning than “restoration” under the 
CWA and OPA, a meaning that “encompass[es] reversing the 
progressive erosion of coastal land and habitats that buffer human 
communities from storms and sustain the area’s biological 
productivity.”48 
 
 40. Of course, as other writers have discussed, these are not the only limitations in the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990’s remedy scheme. See, e.g., Keith J. Jones, Drill Baby . . . Spill Baby: 
How the Oil Pollution Act’s Economic-Damage Liability Cap Contributed to the Deepwater 
Horizon Disaster, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11132, 11134–35 (2010); Ronen 
Perry, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Limits of Civil Liability, 86 WASH. L. REV. 1, 
62–66 (2011). 
 41. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006). 
 42. See id. §§ 2701–62. 
 43. 2011 BP DISASTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 183. 
 44. See id. at 183–84.  
 45. See id. at 182. 
 46. See discussion infra Part III. 
 47. See 2011 BP DISASTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 197–213, especially 212–13 
(detailing the many problems in the Gulf of Mexico and suggesting that it may not be possible 
to meet the OPA’s definition of “restoration”). 
 48. Id. at 212. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/21/2012 10:59 AM 
1863 Legal Remedies  
 1869 
This Article argues that the current legal remedy of natural 
resource damages is likely to be a poor remedy for the Deepwater 
Horizon spill—the “match made in Hell” referenced in this Article’s 
title. While this Article is not the first to make this argument,49 it 
focuses specifically on the deepwater context of the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster and the presumption in natural resource damages 
law that we will be able to both identify and measure the damages 
that offshore oil spills inflict on marine ecosystems. This presumption 
flies in the face of the fact that inadequate knowledge about marine 
ecosystems plagues our marine environmental law and policy.50 As a 
result, requiring such knowledge in natural resource damage 
assessments dooms that damages remedy to inadequacy, especially in 
nonpristine environments like the Gulf.  
Nevertheless, the Deepwater Horizon disaster has already 
inspired, and hopefully will continue to inspire, legal and policy 
reforms of several types. Given the United States’ apparent desire to 
pursue deepwater offshore oil development despite the dearth of 
information about most deepwater marine ecosystems, this Article 
encourages the incorporation of resilience thinking into the law, 
policy, and ethics of deepwater drilling, especially in the already 
severely stressed Gulf of Mexico. As Part IV explores in more detail, 
resilience thinking acknowledges that ecosystems are dynamic—and 
capable of crossing thresholds from one state to another, often with 
consequences that humans consider undesirable. As prelude to that 
discussion, however, Part II of this Article examines in greater detail 
the depth of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the different risks that 
 
 49. See, e.g., Keith H. Hirokawa, Disasters and Ecosystem Services Deprivation: From 
Cuyahoga to the Deepwater Horizon, 74 ALB. L. REV. 543, 553 (2010–2011) (arguing that 
the full environmental effects of the BP oil disaster are likely to be unknown); Itzchak E. 
Kornfeld, Of Dead Pelicans, Turtles, and Marshes: Natural Resources Damages in the Wake of 
the BP Deepwater Horizon Spill, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 317, 331–38 (2011) (arguing 
that natural resource damages should be valued on an ecosystem basis, rather than on a 
damaged-resource-by-damaged-resource basis). 
 50. See COLIN WOODWARD, OCEAN’S END: TRAVELS THROUGH ENDANGERED SEAS 
30 (2000) (“We are better informed about the Moon and Mars than about the bottom of the 
ocean floor; we know more about the life cycle of stars than those of the sperm whale, giant 
squid, and many of the creatures sought by the world’s fishing fleets.”); Robin Kundis Craig, 
Avoiding Jellyfish Seas, or, What Do We Mean by “Sustainable Oceans,” Anyway?, 31 UTAH 
ENVTL. L. REV. 17, 20 (2011) (citing MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS 
AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS 480, 488 (Rashid Hassan et al. 
eds., 2005)); Robin Kundis Craig, Regulation of U.S. Marine Resources: An Overview of the 
Current Complexity, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T. 3, 3 (2004). 
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depth imposed compared to shallower water oil spills, and the 
evolving record of damage to life and ecosystems near the bottom of 
the Gulf of Mexico. Part III, in turn, first provides an overview of 
the natural resource damages regimes in the CWA and OPA, then 
discusses the United States government’s December 2010 civil 
complaint for natural resource damages resulting from the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill, and concludes by addressing the lack of needed 
information for making comprehensive natural resource damages 
claims. Part IV then considers the possible improvements that 
resilience thinking offers to law, policy, and corporate ethics to get 
around this “match made in Hell” by encouraging a view of the 
Gulf—and other areas of the ocean—as as ever-changing sites that 
respond to internal and external pressures in complex and not-
entirely-predictable ways. 
II. DEPTH, OIL SPILL DAMAGE, AND THE LONG-TERM PROGNOSIS 
FOR THE GULF OF MEXICO’S DEEPWATER ECOSYSTEMS 
Offshore oil drilling is nothing new in the Gulf of Mexico; the 
first rig was constructed in 1947.51 Nevertheless, it bears repeating 
that the Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred at great depth; it was 
the first oil spill of its kind in the United States and, indeed, “it 
happened in deeper water than any other major oil spill in history.”52 
The rig was operating in waters that were about 4130 feet (1400 
meters) deep.53  
While Shell built the first deepwater (defined as drilling in waters 
deeper than 1000 feet54) oil platform in the Gulf in 1985,55 
deepwater wells remained uncommon in the Gulf until after the 
current legal regimes for environmental damages were already in 
place. For example, the Deepwater Horizon Commission noted that 
in 1990—as Congress was drafting the OPA—“most oil and gas 
from the Gulf had still come from shallow water; average 
production-weighted depth ha[d] barely reached 250 feet.”56 Under 
 
 51. See NICK HUNTER, OFFSHORE OIL DRILLING 8 (Adam Miller et al. eds., 2012). 
 52. Mark Schrope, Deep Wounds, 472 NATURE 152, 152 (2011). 
 53. See Deepwater Horizon Drills World's Deepest Oil & Gas Well, TRANSOCEAN, 
http://www.deepwater.com/fw/main/IDeepwater-Horizon-i-Drills-Worlds-Deepest-Oil-
and-Gas-Well-419C151.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2011). 
 54. See HUNTER, supra note 51, at 9. 
 55. See id. at 8. 
 56. 2011 BP DISASTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 41. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/21/2012 10:59 AM 
1863 Legal Remedies  
 1871 
the American Academy of Underwater Sciences’ recommendations, 
technical divers using “normal” scuba gear and compressed air can 
dive to up to 190 feet,57 while technical divers using mixed gas 
systems can dive to greater than 260 feet.58  
In other words, U.S. laws governing liability for offshore oil spills 
were drafted when offshore oil and gas drilling still operated almost 
entirely at a human scale—when a viable solution to most wellhead 
leaks was sending human workers down to fix them. In contrast, as 
the Institute for Southern Studies has reported, “the deeper you go, 
the more demanding the circumstances. The pressures are enormous, 
temperatures are low. You can’t send divers down there to fix 
anything. The chemistry of the water is different than in shallow 
water. Fixes and repairs that work in shallow water don’t work in 
deep water.”59 
The oil gushing from the Macondo wellhead was thus beyond 
the direct reach of any human being. Moreover, as the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster made clear, “[t]he deep ocean presents lots of 
problems, including the corrosive effect of salt water on metal rigs 
and drilling equipment,” problems with the effects of “extreme 
pressure” on equipment, and “the fact that gases may become solid 
crystals . . . .”60 
Even the oil itself does not behave the same at greater depths as 
it does on the surface. Oil discharging from the Macondo wellhead 
was subjected to pressures of over 125 atmospheres61—that is, 
pressures 125 times the pressure at sea level—and very low 
 
 57. See William Dent, AAUS Deep Diving Standards, in PROCEEDINGS OF ADVANCED 
SCIENTIFIC DIVING WORKSHOP: FEBRUARY 23–24, 2006, at 171, 174 (Michael A. Lang & N. 
Eugene Smith eds., 2006), available at http://archive.rubicon-foundation.org/ 
xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/4669/SI_2006_18.pdf?sequence=3.  
 58. See id. at 186–87. 
 59. Michael T. Klare, Oil Spill Reveals Dangers of Deep Water Drilling, FACING SOUTH 
(June 4, 2010, 12:05 PM), http://www.southernstudies.org/2010/06/oil-spill-reveals-
dangers-of-deep-water-drilling.html. For an overview of the technologies used in deepwater oil 
drilling and the risks involved at the Macondo well, see Mark A. Latham, Five Thousand Feet 
and Below: The Failure to Adequately Regulate Deepwater Oil Production Technology, 38 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 343, 346–53 (2011). 
 60. HUNTER, supra note 51, at 16. 
 61. “For every 33 feet (10 meters) of depth, the pressure increases by a further one 
atmosphere.” Mark Moss, Teaching Guide: Feeling Pressured, PBS.ORG, http:// 
www.pbs.org/saf/1102/teaching/teaching.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). The Macondo 
wellhead was at 4130 feet; 4130 feet divided by 33 feet per atmosphere is 125.152 
atmospheres of pressure. 
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temperatures. Released oil subjected to such pressures and low 
temperatures does not necessarily float to the surface. Studies 
reported in July 2011 confirmed that released oil behaves very 
differently at depth: 
Unlike a surface spill, from which these volatile compounds 
evaporate into the atmosphere, in the deep water under pressure, 
light hydrocarbon components predominantly dissolve or form 
hydrates, compounds containing water molecules. And depending 
on its properties, the resulting complex mixture can rise, sink, or 
even remain suspended in the water, and possibly go on to cause 
damage to seafloor life far from the original spill.62 
Moreover, these studies noted that, in particular, the behavior of 
“light-weight, water-soluble hydrocarbons such as methane, benzene 
and naphthalene released from the base of the rig” might be critical 
to discovering and assessing the extent of deepwater environmental 
damage.63  
Such differences were noted by observers responding to the 
Deepwater Horizon spill. They saw long strings of viscous material 
coming to the surface, dubbed “sea snot” and compared to egg drop 
soup, that appeared to be a mixture of oil, phytoplankton 
(microscopic plants that are the basis of marine food webs), and 
other organic material.64 This material appeared to be the physical 
manifestation of differences in oil behavior that the July 2011 studies 
would later predict, and it signals potential long-term problems for 
the Gulf. As a report in Nature explained in April 2011: 
 In shallow spills, oil tends to rise quickly to the surface, where it 
weathers, dissolves and evaporates in chemically predictable 
patterns. However, the largest drops of oil from the Deepwater 
Horizon well head took at least four hours to reach the surface, and 
smaller droplets rose much more slowly. During that long voyage, 
smaller droplets could have lost some of the lighter hydrocarbons 




 62. See Deep Below the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: New Molecular Model Better 
Explains Diffusion of Spill Under Water, SCIENCEDAILY (July 18, 2011), http:// 
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/07/110718151549.htm. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Schrope, supra note 52, at 152–53. 
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 Still, the issue of how the oil transformed is a crucial one for 
researchers to address. The processes involved can affect the oil’s 
toxicity and how long it is likely to stick around.65  
In addition, three peer-reviewed studies confirmed that a 
“plume” of oil droplets and dissolved gases stretched several miles 
southwest of the wellhead between 3200 and 4200 feet below the 
surface.66 While decomposition of this plume by bacteria is expected, 
“[c]hemical analyses of water samples taken from the established 
deepwater plume in May 2010 suggest that hydrocarbon 
concentrations were high enough at the time to cause acute toxicity 
to exposed organisms.”67 Almost a year later, Nature reported that 
“signs of significant damage are showing up farther from shore and 
in deeper water. It was a stroke of bad luck that the well happened to 
be located in the most species-rich part of the deep gulf.”68 
In addition, given the behavioral differences between oil released 
at great depths and oil released in surface spills, oil from the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster may still be collecting on and spreading 
across the seafloor.69 Researchers have found a lumpy, cauliflower-
like layer of brown material on the Gulf floor, which may be the 
congealed heavier components of oil released from the Macondo 
well—components that oil-digesting microbes have a harder time 
breaking down.70 Moreover, “near to the well head, the layer shows 
little microbial activity, suggesting it will not break down quickly.”71  
Lack of knowledge regarding the oil spill’s effect on the 
deepwater ecosystems of the Gulf is a recurring theme, even more 
than a year after the spill. For example, in an April 2011 interview 
with the Orlando Sentinel, NOAA Administrator Jane Lubchenco 
noted that “we still don’t have a good handle on what the potential 
damage that was done by that subsurface oil and whether [deepwater 
plumes] were natural or caused by dispersants that were used.”72 
 
 65. Id. at 153. 
 66. See 2011 BP DISASTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 182; see also Schrope, supra note 
52, at 152 (reporting similar information about deepwater plumes). 
 67. 2011 BP DISASTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 182. 
 68. Schrope, supra note 52, at 152. 
 69. See 2011 BP DISASTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 182. 
 70. See Schrope, supra note 52, at 153. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Mike Thomas, Gulf Oil Spill 1 Year Later: NOAA Boss Answers Mike Thomas’ 
Questions, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 19, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/7e6sdtf.  
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Nevertheless, NOAA has “video images that indicate there are spots 
on the [deep Gulf] seafloor where there is clear evidence of oil 
residue. But we don’t have good information how extensive that 
is.”73 Part of the problem, Lubchenco emphasized, is the sheer size 
of the Gulf and the potentially affected area. Indeed, “[t]he 
challenge here is how to sample a huge, huge area, which is what the 
Gulf is.”74 Another problem is that there are numerous natural oil 
seeps and other oil spills in the Gulf, making it difficult to tie 
particular environmental damage at depth—such as videotaped 
damage to deep-sea coral reefs—to the BP oil spill.75  
Nevertheless, there is no question that these deep marine 
ecosystems are “critical environmental habitat[s].” In Lubchenco’s 
words, the deep Gulf ecosystem is “important to the functioning of 
the whole system. The coral and sponge communities that are down 
there are important ones. We know relatively little about them to 
begin with.”76 Other researchers emphasize that the Macondo well 
blowout and oil spill occurred in an area of particular species richness 
in the Gulf’s depths—“some 1,728 species inhabit the region 
surrounding Deepwater Horizon at depths of between 1,000 and 
3,000 metres, where the well is located.”77 As the Nature report 
summarized, one year after the oil spill, “[o]n the water’s surface, 
there are no lasting impressions of the crisis, but not so below. The 
wreckage of one of the world’s most advanced drilling rigs lies 
hidden on the sea floor, as do the ecological damages that are 
proving so challenging to assess.”78 
One lesson from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, therefore, is 
that deepwater drilling in the Gulf placed the productive ecosystems 
that exist in its depths at risk before either those ecosystems or the 
risks of deepwater drilling—including the absolute need for different 
kinds of advanced technological emergency responses—were fully 
appreciated or even understood.79 
 
 73. Id. (alteration in original). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Schrope, supra note 52, at 154. 
 78. Id. 
 79. The Deepwater Horizon Commission summarized: 
Because the Deepwater Horizon spill was unprecedented in size, location, and 
duration, deepwater ecosystems were exposed to large volumes of oil for an 
extended period. It will take further investigation and more time to assess the 
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This Article suggests that natural resource damages—or, more 
precisely, the limits of natural resource damages as a remedy in 
situations like the Deepwater Horizon oil spill—could help prompt a 
change in how we think about regulating deepwater offshore oil 
drilling, a change to the resilience thinking discussed in Part IV. It is 
to those damages, therefore, that this Article now turns. 
III. NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES UNDER THE CWA AND THE 
OPA, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S COMPLAINT 
Federal law provides damages remedies for environmental 
injuries caused by oil spills under both the Federal Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”)80 and the Federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”).81 
These damages, referred to as natural resource damages, are available 
to the governments—the federal government, state governments, 
and tribes—who act as trustees for the natural resources at stake.82  
Section A below discusses the available CWA damages remedies, 
while Section B discusses the damages remedies available under the 
OPA. Finally, Section C concludes by discussing the federal 
government’s complaint in the suit it brought seeking these damages 
remedies from BP and several other defendants in the wake of the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster, giving particular attention to the 
informational deficiencies revealed in this complaint that make 
assessment of appropriate damages so challenging.  
A. The Clean Water Act 
Section 311 of the CWA governs liability for oil and other 
hazardous substances discharged into the nation’s “navigable 
waters.”83 Specifically, this section seeks to effectuate Congress’s 
policy “that there should be no discharges of oil or hazardous 
substances into or upon the navigable waters of the United States, 
 
impacts on these ecosystems, their extent and duration. Unfortunately, except for 
studies that have focused on rare and specialized communities associated with rocky 
outcrops or seeps, scientific understanding of the deepwater Gulf ecosystem has not 
advanced with the industrial development of deepwater drilling and production. 
2011 BP DISASTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 182. 
 80. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–387 (2006). 
 81. See id. §§ 2701–62. 
 82. See Oil Pollution Act, 15 C.F.R. § 990.11 (2010); 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(rr) (2007) 
(defining “trustee” or “natural resource trustee” as used in the CWA and CERCLA). 
 83. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006). 
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adjoining shorelines, or into or upon the waters of the contiguous 
zone, or in connection with activities under the Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act.”84 Because the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
regulates offshore drilling,85 these CWA liability provisions apply to 
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Moreover, § 311 explicitly prohibits 
discharges of oil “which may affect natural resources belonging to, 
appertaining to, or under the exclusive management authority of the 
United States”86 or “which may be harmful to the public health or 
welfare or the environment of the United States, including but not 
limited to fish, shellfish, wildlife, and public and private property, 
shorelines, and beaches.”87  
Section 311 provides for several kinds of liability for discharged 
oil. Owners, operators, and persons in charge of offshore facilities are 
liable for administrative and civil penalties88 if they discharge oil that 
violates the prohibition on threatening natural resources; civil 
penalties are up to $25,000 per day of violation or $1000 per barrel 
of oil.89 Moreover, owners and operators who fail to remove the oil 
or to comply with the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) 
orders incur civil penalties of $25,000 per day of violation or up to 
three times the amount that the federal government has to spend to 
clean up the discharged oil.90 Failure to comply with other 
regulations warrants a civil penalty of $25,000 per day.91 Grossly 
negligent dischargers are liable for civil penalties “of not less than 
$100,000, and not more than $3,000 per barrel of oil.”92 Finally, the 
government may recover all removal costs from the offending owner 
 
 84. Id. § 1321(b)(1). A “discharge” for purposes of this section includes “any spilling, 
leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying or dumping . . . .” Id. § 1321(a)(2). Given this 
broad definition, the Deepwater Horizon spill constitutes a “discharge” for purposes of § 311 
liability. 
 85. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–56. 
 86. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3). 
 87. Id. § 1321(b)(4). 
 88. See id. § 1321(b)(7)(A). 
 89. See id. The owner or operator of an offshore facility is, tautologically, “any person 
owning operating, or chartering by demise . . . such . . . an offshore facility,” but it also 
includes, “in the case of any abandoned offshore facility, the person who owned or operated 
such facility immediately prior to such abandonment.” Id. § 1321(a)(6). “‘Person’ includes an 
individual, firm, corporation, association, and a partnership.” Id. § 1321(a)(7). 
 90. See id. § 1321(b)(7)(B). 
 91. See id. § 1321(b)(7)(C). 
 92. Id. § 1321(b)(7)(D). 
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or operator,93 up to a cap of $50 million, but this cap is eliminated if 
the discharge of oil “was the result of willful negligence or willful 
misconduct within the privity and knowledge of the owner.”94 The 
owner’s or operator’s defenses to liability are limited to: “(A) an act 
of God, (B) an act of war, (C) negligence on the part of the United 
States Government, or (D) an act or omission of a third party 
without regard to whether any such act or omission was or was not 
negligent.”95 
Through regulations, the EPA has adopted what is known as the 
“sheen test” for determining whether discharges of oil are harmful to 
the public health or welfare (or environment) and hence violate       
§ 311. Under this test, an owner or operator is liable under the 
CWA if an oil discharge violates applicable water quality standards or 
“[c]ause[s] a film or sheen upon or discoloration of the surface of 
the water or adjoining shorelines or cause[s] a sludge or emulsion to 
be deposited beneath the surface of the water or upon adjoining 
shorelines.”96 In addition, and relevant to the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill, “[a]ddition of dispersants or emulsifiers to oil to be discharged 
that would circumvent the provisions of . . . [the relevant 
regulations] is prohibited.”97 
Originally, the regulations governing natural resource damages 
for discharges of oil under § 311 were the same as the regulations 
governing natural resource damages under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(“CERCLA”).98 However, since the enactment of the OPA, 
NOAA’s natural resource damages regulations supersede the EPA’s 
natural resource damages regulations “with regard to oil discharges 
covered by the OPA.”99 Nevertheless, “[f]or natural resource 
damages resulting from a discharge or release of a mixture of oil and 
hazardous substances”—such as the mixture of oil and dispersant in 
many parts of the Gulf—“trustees must use . . . [the EPA’s 
regulations] in order to obtain a rebuttable presumption” that the 
 
 93. See id. § 1321(b)(10). 
 94. Id. § 1321(f)(3). 
 95. Id. 
 96. 40 C.F.R. § 110.3 (2010). 
 97. Id. § 110.4. 
 98. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.10 (2010). CERCLA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75 
(2006). 
 99. 15 C.F.R. § 990.20(a) (2010). 
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damages claimed are consistent with the National Contingency Plan 
(“NCP”).100 As a result, CWA natural resource damages remain 
potentially relevant to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, although in 
the BP oil spill litigation the United States has so far based its natural 
resource damages claims entirely on the OPA. 
The EPA’s natural resource damages regulations provide an 
extensive assessment procedure.101 If the natural resource trustee102 
properly follows the assessment procedures, it may claim: 
(1) Damages as determined in accordance with this part and 
calculated based on injuries occurring from the onset of the release 
through the recovery period, less any mitigation of those injuries by 
response actions taken or anticipated, plus any increase in injuries 
that are reasonably unavoidable as a result of response actions taken 
or anticipated; 
(2) The costs of emergency restoration efforts under § 11.21 of 
this part; 
(3) The reasonable and necessary costs of the assessment, to 
include: 
 (i) The cost of performing the preassessment and Assessment 
Plan phases and the methodologies provided in Subpart D or E 
of this part; and 
 (ii) Administrative costs and expenses necessary for, and 
incidental to, the assessment, assessment planning, and 
restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, and/or acquisition of 
equivalent resources planning, and any restoration, 
rehabilitation, replacement, and/or acquisition of equivalent 
resources undertaken . . . .103 
 
 100. Id. § 990.20(c). 
 101. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.13. 
 102. A trustee or natural resource trustee is defined as  
any Federal natural resources management agency designated in the NCP and any 
State agency designated by the Governor of each State, pursuant to section 
107(f)(2)(B) of CERCLA, that may prosecute claims for damages under section 
107(f) or 111(b) of CERCLA; or an Indian tribe, that may commence an action 
under section 126(d) of CERCLA. 
Id. § 11.14(rr). 
 103. Id. § 11.15(a). 
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“Damages,” for purposes of this provision, are “the amount of 
money sought by the natural resource trustee as compensation for 
injury, destruction, or loss of natural resources.”104  
 
The ultimate goal of these natural resource damages is either to 
“restor[e] or rehabilitat[e] the injured natural resources to a 
condition where they can provide the level of services available at 
baseline” or to accomplish “the replacement and/or acquisition of 
equivalent natural resources capable of providing such services.”105 
“Services” in this context refer to ecosystem services—specifically, 
“physical and biological functions performed by the resource 
including the human uses of those functions. These services are the 
result of the physical, chemical, or biological quality of the 
resource.”106 The inclusion of services is designed to ensure that 
trustee officials have sufficient discretion to actually reestablish 
proper ecosystem functioning and make the public “whole.”107 
B. The OPA 
In addition to natural resource damages available under § 311 of 
the CWA, natural resource damages are also available under the 
OPA. Congress enacted the OPA in response to the 1989 Exxon 
Valdez oil spill in Alaska.108 The main effect of the OPA vis-à-vis the 
CWA is to expand responsible parties’ potential liability for oil spills. 
Thus, regarding these parties’ general liability, § 1002 states: 
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject to 
the provisions of this Act, each responsible party for a vessel or a 
facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial 
threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or 
adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable for the 
removal costs and damages specified in subsection (b) of this 
 
 104. Id. § 11.14(l). 
 105. Id. § 11.82(b). 
 106. Id. § 11.14(nn). 
 107. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262, 14,272–73 (Mar. 25, 
1994) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11). For a discussion of ecosystem services losses in the 
context of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, see Hirokawa, supra note 49, at 550–53 (explaining 
ecosystem services), 553–60 (discussing the Gulf’s ecosystem services put at risk by the BP oil 
spill). 
 108. See S. REP. NO. 101-99, at 1–2 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 749, 750–
51. 
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section that result from such incident.109 
“[R]esponsible” parties covered by this provision include, relevant to 
the Deepwater Horizon’s offshore facility, “the lessee or the 
permittee of the area in which the facility is located or the holder of a 
right of use and easement granted under applicable State law or the 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. § 1301–1356) for 
the area in which the facility is located,” excluding governments.110 
The definition of a “discharge” of oil is similar to but broader than 
the definition of that term under the CWA, being “any emission 
(other than natural seepage), intentional or unintentional, and 
includ[ing], but . . . not limited to, spilling, leaking, pumping, 
pouring, emitting, emptying, or dumping.”111 Complete defenses are 
limited to “an act of God,” “an act of war,” and acts or omissions of 
unrelated third parties.112 
Once a responsible party triggers the OPA, liability primarily 
revolves around removal costs and statutorily designated “damages.” 
With respect to removal costs, responsible parties are liable for “all 
removal costs incurred by the United States, a State, or an Indian 
tribe” under federal or state law, and for “any removal costs incurred 
by any person for acts taken by the person which are consistent with 
the National Contingency Plan.”113 “[R]emoval costs” are “the costs 
of removal that are incurred after a discharge of oil has occurred” or 
the costs of preventing, minimizing, or mitigating a threatened oil 
spill.114 “[R]emoval,” in turn, “means containment and removal of 
oil or a hazardous substance from water and shorelines or the taking 
of other actions as may be necessary to minimize or mitigate damage 
to the public health or welfare, including, but not limited to, fish, 
shellfish, wildlife, and public and private property, shorelines, and 
beaches.”115 Under the OPA, unlike under the Clean Water Act, 
there is no limit on a responsible party’s liability for removal costs in 
connection with an oil spill at an offshore facility that is not a 
deepwater port.116 
 
 109. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006). 
 110. Id. § 2701(32)(C). 
 111. Id. § 2701(7). 
 112. Id. § 2703(a). 
 113. Id. § 2702(b)(1). 
 114. Id. § 2701(31). 
 115. Id. § 2701(30). 
 116. See id. § 2704(a)(3) (designating that an offshore facility is liable for “all removal 
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Damages under § 1002 include several forms of private and 
governmental damages: “[d]amages for injury to, or economic losses 
resulting from destruction of, real or personal property”; “[d]amages 
for loss of subsistence use of natural resources”; “[d]amages equal to 
the net loss of taxes, royalties, rents, fees, or net profit shares due to 
the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or 
natural resources”; “[d]amages equal to the loss of profits or 
impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss 
of real property, personal property, or natural resources”; and 
“[d]amages for net costs of providing increased or additional public 
services during or after removal activities, including protection from 
fire, safety, or health hazards, caused by a discharge of oil.”117 Most 
relevantly for this Article, § 1002 also explicitly provides for natural 
resource damages—that is, “[d]amages for injury to, destruction of, 
loss of, or loss of use of, natural resources, including the reasonable 
costs of assessing the damage.”118 Natural resource damages can be 
recovered “by a United States trustee, a State trustee, an Indian tribe 
trustee, or a foreign trustee.”119 “Natural resources,” for purposes of 
these damage assessments, similar to the definition under the CWA 
regulations, include  
land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water 
supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held 
in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United 
States (including the resources of the exclusive economic zone), 
any State or local government or Indian tribe, or any foreign 
government.120 
The OPA designates NOAA as the agency responsible for 
promulgating natural resource damages regulations and provides that 
 
costs”). 
 117. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(B)–(F). 
 118. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(A). 
 119. Id.; see also id. § 2706 (emphasizing who can recover natural resource damages and 
clarifying how natural resource trustees are appointed). Although natural resource damages 
claims in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill have so far focused on the United States 
and the Gulf states, several tribes are also potential claimants. For an overview of the relation of 
the oil spill to Gulf tribes, see Diane Courselle, We (Used to?) Make a Good Gumbo—The BP 
Deepwater Horizon Disaster and the Heightened Threats to the Unique Cultural Communities 
of the Louisiana Gulf Coast, 24 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 19, 26–28, 37–39 (2010); Erick Rhoan, 
Comment, The Rightful Position: The BP Oil Spill and Gulf Coast Tribes, 20 SAN JOAQUIN 
AGRIC. L. REV. 173, 184–92 (2011). 
 120. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20). 
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damage assessments done in accordance with the regulations “shall 
have the force and effect of a rebuttable presumption on behalf of 
the trustee in any administrative or judicial proceeding under this 
Act.”121 
 
The OPA generally caps the responsible parties’ liability for 
statutory damages resulting from a release of oil, including capping 
natural resource damages from an offshore, nondeepwater port 
facility at $75 million.122 However, the cap does not apply “if the 
incident was proximately caused by . . . gross negligence or willful 
misconduct of, or . . . the violation of an applicable Federal safety, 
construction, or operating regulation by, the responsible party,” its 
agents and employees, or its contractual activities.123 The cap also 
does not apply if the responsible party does not report the incident as 
required, does not cooperate with the removal activities, or does not 
comply with orders.124 
NOAA’s natural resource damages regulations implementing the 
OPA emphasize that natural resource damages “make the 
environment and public whole” by returning “the injured natural 
resources and services to baseline and [providing] compensation for 
interim losses of such natural resources and services from the date of 
the incident until recovery.”125 The regulations establish a preference 
for incident-based restoration but also allow for Regional 
Restoration Plans.126 Moreover, in pursuing natural resource 
restoration, trustees must ensure compliance with other 
environmental and natural resources laws, including the federal 
Endangered Species Act, the Coastal Zone Management Act, the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the National Marine Sanctuaries Act, the 
National Historic Preservation Act, the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act, and the Archaeological Resources Protection Act.127 
Importantly, the regulations do not require active restoration, and 
 
 121. Id. § 2706(e)(2). 
 122. See id. § 2704(a)(3). 
 123. Id. § 2704(c)(1). 
 124. See id. § 2704(c)(2). 
 125. 15 C.F.R. § 990.10 (2010). 
 126. See id. § 990.15(b). 
 127. See id. § 990.24(b). 
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trustees may allow natural restoration to take its course if costs do 
not justify active restoration.128 
C. The Federal Government’s Complaint and Problems Because of 
Insufficient Information 
Despite the uncertainties surrounding the Deepwater Horizon’s 
immediate and long-term damages to the natural environment of the 
Gulf, the United States filed its complaint against BP and several 
other defendants in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of Louisiana on December 15, 2010.129 The complaint refers to the 
BP oil spill as “one of the worst environmental disasters in American 
history,” which caused “grave harm to natural resources across 
several States and related waters.”130 It seeks both removal costs and 
damages under the OPA and civil penalties under the Clean Water 
Act.131 The United States claims damages in excess of $75 million 
under the OPA132 and charges the defendants with gross negligence 
and willful misconduct133 to justify exceeding the OPA cap.  
Perhaps most interestingly for this Article, however, is the fact 
that the United States’ complaint fully embraces the indeterminacy 
of natural resource damages: 
Discharged oil and some of the response activities to address the 
discharges of oil have resulted in injury to, loss of, loss of use of or 
destruction of natural resources in and around the Gulf of Mexico 
and along adjoining shorelines of the United States, and also have 
impaired or caused the loss of services that those resources provide. 
The full extent of potential injuries, destruction, loss and loss of 
services is not yet fully known and may not be fully known for many 
years. On information and belief, resources and resource services 
that have been injured, destroyed, or lost include, but are not 
limited to, hundreds of miles of coastal habitats, including salt 
marshes, sandy beaches, and mangroves; a variety of wildlife, 
including birds, sea turtles, and marine mammals; lost human-use 
opportunities associated with various natural resources in the Gulf 
 
 128. See id. §§ 990.52(c), 990.53, 990.54. 
 129. See generally Complaint, United States v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc., No. 2:10-
cv-04536 (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 2010). 
 130. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. 
 131. See id. ¶¶ 3–4. 
 132. See id. ¶ 67. 
 133. See id. ¶ 69. 
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region, including but, not limited to fishing, swimming, beach-
going, and viewing of birds and wildlife; and waters of the Gulf of 
Mexico, including various biota, benthic communities, marine 
organisms, coral, fish, and water-column habitat.134 
Moreover, the United States explicitly reserved its rights under the 
CWA, OPA, and other statutes and maritime law to pursue 
additional penalties and damages.135 The federal government and the 
states are currently conducting a major natural resource damages 
assessment (“NRDA”),136 but the process is expected to take years, 
and the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for 
restoration efforts is not expected until 2012.137 
More fundamentally, there are many reasons to be skeptical that 
the NRDA process will be able to fulfill the basic purposes of natural 
resource damages in the context of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. 
As discussed, natural resource damages embody a legal recognition 
that some forms of pollution, like major oil spills, cause both short-
term and long-term damage to species and ecosystems, that this 
damage matters to human beings as well as to the environment, and 
that this damage involves substantial economic loss, including costs 
related to restoration and replacement. Nevertheless, natural 
resource damages are notoriously difficult to assess and quantify, and 
those difficulties may be insurmountable for the Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill, especially with respect to deepwater ecosystems. The 
Deepwater Horizon Commission has recognized these difficulties: 
Identifying and quantifying damages, particularly where complex 
ecosystems are involved, present enormous challenges. Developing 
sound sampling protocols that cover adequate time scales, teasing 
out the effects of other environmental disturbances, and scaling 
damages to the appropriate restoration projects takes considerable 
time. A typical damage assessment can take years. Two sets of 
determinations—one concerning baseline conditions against which 
damages to each species or habitat will be assessed and another 
 
 134. Id. ¶ 66 (emphasis added). 
 135. See id. ¶ 92. 
 136. See Deepwater Horizon Incident Natural Resource Damage Assessment, NAT’L 
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/news/weeklynews/ 
june10/nrda-deepwater.html (last modified July 1, 2010). 
 137. See NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., PUBLIC SCOPING FOR 
PREPARATION OF A PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE 
DEEPWATER HORIZON BP OIL SPILL 9 (2011), available at http://tinyurl.com/3jv356c.  
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concerning the quantification of those damages—are particularly 
difficult and consequential in terms of the overall results.138 
The primary difficulty in assessing natural resource damages for 
the Gulf’s deepwater ecosystems, as Jane Lubchenco’s April 2011 
interview reveals, is that baseline information about these ecosystems 
is simply unavailable. Under both the CWA and OPA oil spill 
regulations, natural resource damages are measured against an 
explicit baseline—“the condition or conditions that would have 
existed at the assessment area had the discharge of oil . . . under 
investigation not occurred” under the CWA,139 or “the condition of 
the natural resources and services that would have existed had the 
incident not occurred” under the OPA.140 Such measurements, 
however, presume sufficient prior knowledge about the damaged 
ecosystem to determine what is different after the oil spill. Such prior 
knowledge is generally lacking for deepwater ecosystems (and many 
not-so-deep marine ecosystems, as well). Moreover, conditions in 
the Gulf make it particularly difficult to presume that all or even 
most of the oil damage found was caused by the Macondo well 
discharge—unlike, for example, the case of the 2011 Yellowstone oil 
pipeline leak141—because natural oil seeps, multiple smaller spills, and 
discharges of oil from hundreds of other offshore rigs are part of the 
baseline conditions.  
This is the dilemma currently facing the United States 
government, the Gulf states, and certain tribes who are pursing 
natural resource damages for the Deepwater Horizon spill. 
Nevertheless, even if they acquire sufficient information to establish 
“adequate” natural resource damages for the Gulf’s deepwater 
ecosystems, thereby allowing them to measure damages against an 
informed baseline, it is still uncertain whether the Gulf is resilient 
enough to recover from the oil spill. Notwithstanding this major 
uncertainty, though, the current legal regime—including offshore 
 
 138. 2011 BP DISASTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 183–84. 
 139. 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(e) (2010). 
 140. 15 C.F.R. § 990.30 (2010); see also id. § 990.52(a) (“In addition to determining 
whether injuries have resulted from the incident, trustees must quantify the degree, and spatial 
and temporal extent of such injuries relative to baseline.”). 
 141. See, e.g., Tara Thean, Why the Yellowstone Spill Is So Tough to Clean Up, 
ECOCENTRIC: TIME BLOG (July 11, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/ 
2011/07/11/why-the-yellowstone-oil-spill-is-so-tough-to-clean-up/ (actively comparing the 
two oil spills but squarely blaming ExxonMobil for the damage to the Yellowstone River). 
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drilling regulations and available natural resource damages 
remedies—fails to consider the important concept of resilience. The 
next Part of this Article thus argues that resilience thinking should 
become one of the bedrock principles underlying the regulation of 
offshore drilling and oil spill remedies.  
IV. INCORPORATING RESILIENCE THINKING TO CLOSE THE 
LIABILITY/REALITY GAP 
Ecological resilience and resilience theory acknowledge that 
ecosystems are dynamic—not, as prior theories had assumed, 
inherently stable systems tending toward an equilibrium.142 
Resilience theory recognizes that there are at least three different 
ways in which ecosystems experience and respond to change and 
perturbation—three different aspects of “resilience.”143 The first and 
most common understanding of resilience refers to an ecosystem’s 
ability to absorb change and persist in function and relationships.144 
This sense of resilience refers to “the rate or speed of recovery of a 
system following a shock.”145 As a practical matter in the law of 
natural resource management, the law tends to expect that 
ecosystems will be resilient in this first sense—that is, the law 
assumes that ecosystems will generally successfully absorb any 
human-induced perturbations of the system. As a result, natural 
resources law is what I will term “first sense resilience dependence,” 
but that dependence reflects a truncated understanding of 
ecosystems’ resilience and capacity for change. 
Importantly, however, the second aspect of resilience theory 
acknowledges that ecosystems can exist in multiple states rather than 
stabilizing around a single equilibrium state; as a result, changes and 
disturbances can “push” ecosystems over thresholds from one 
ecosystem state to another.146 This second sense of resilience 
“assumes multiple states (or ‘regimes’) and is defined as the 
magnitude of a disturbance that triggers a shift between alternative 
states.”147 For example, the boreal forests of Canada can exist in at 
 
 142. See Lance H. Gunderson & Craig R. Allen, Why Resilience? Why Now?, in 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE xiii–xv (Lance H. Gunderson et al. eds., 2010). 
 143. See id. at xv (citation omitted). 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. Id. at xv–xvi. 
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least two states with respect to spruce budworms: a “no outbreak” 
state “characterized by low numbers of budworm and young, fast-
growing trees,” and an “outbreak” state “characterized by high 
numbers of budworm and old, senescent trees.”148 The shift between 
the two appears to relate to an increase in canopy volume, which in 
turn affects bird populations and the birds’ ability to control the 
pest.149 Regime-shift models can also help to explain outbreaks of 
some human diseases.150 However, natural resources law and policy 
generally do not acknowledge this second sense of resilience, and, as 
a result, it generally does not incorporate mechanisms for 
acknowledging, responding to, or even trying to avoid ecological 
regime shifts. 
Finally, resilience theory also acknowledges “the surprising and 
discontinuous nature of change, such as the collapse of fish stock or 
the sudden outbreak of spruce budworms in forests.”151 In other 
words, the long-time persistence of an ecosystem (or collection of 
multiple ecosystems) like the Gulf of Mexico in an apparently stable, 
productive ecosystem state is absolutely no guarantee that humans 
can continue to disturb and abuse the system and expect only a 
gradual or linear response.  
As was true for the second sense of resilience, natural resource 
law in general and marine resources law in particular do not deal well 
with the possibility of sudden and dramatic ecosystem changes. 
Nevertheless, such regime shifts have been documented for a 
number of marine ecosystems. For example, 
In Jamaica, the effects of overfishing, hurricane damage, and 
disease have combined to destroy most corals, whose abundance 
has declined from more than 50 percent in the late 1970s to less 
than 5 percent today. A dramatic phase shift has occurred, 
producing a system dominated by fleshy macroalgae (more than 90 
percent cover). Immediate implementation of management 
procedures is necessary to avoid further catastrophic damage.152  
Similarly, the presence or absence of sea otters can significantly 
influence the structure and function of Alaskan kelp forests because 
 
 148. Id. at xvi. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. Id. at xv. 
 152. Terence P. Hughes, Catastrophes, Phase Shifts, and Large-Scale Degradation of a 
Caribbean Coral Reef, 265 SCI. 1547, 1547 (1994). 
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the otters, when present, control sea urchin populations, allowing for 
more extensive coral growth.153 In some locations, moreover, “sea 
urchin population changes in response to sea otter predation were 
rapid and extreme” and could result in “short-term changes in kelp 
density.”154 
The current law, policy, and remedy regime for offshore oil 
drilling effectively presumes that marine ecosystems have virtually 
unlimited first-sense resilience with respect to oil spills—in crudest 
terms, that restoration will always be possible, and perhaps even 
through entirely natural means.155 Our experience with the last large 
oil spill in U.S. waters, however, suggests otherwise. 
More than twenty years before the Deepwater Horizon disaster, 
on March 24, 1989, the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in 
Prince William Sound, Alaska, spilling approximately eleven million 
gallons of crude oil.156 Although the oil eventually affected about 
1300 miles of Alaskan coastline,157 it is important to remember that, 
in the context of the Deepwater Horizon spill, the Exxon Valdez was 
a relatively simple—and relatively small—surface release of oil. Even 
so, more than twenty years later, according to NOAA, “While the 
vast majority of the spill area now appears to have recovered, pockets 
of crude oil remain in some locations, and there is evidence that 
some damage is continuing.”158 More specifically, NOAA reports 
that, overall, the Prince William Sound ecosystem has proven 
resilient in the first sense—it has been able to absorb most changes 
and persist in function and relationships.159 
 
 153. James Estes & David O. Duggins, Sea Otters and Kelp Forests in Alaska: Generality 
and Variation in a Community Ecological Paradigm, 65 ECOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS 75, 75 
(1995).  
 154. Id. at 87. 
 155. See discussion supra notes 124–130 and accompanying text. 
 156. See Office of Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (EVOS) Damage Assessment and Restoration, 
NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV. ALASKA REG’L OFFICE, http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/oil/ (last 
visited Aug. 8, 2011). 
 157. See id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Specifically: 
Many shorelines that were heavily oiled and then intensively cleaned now appear 
much as they did before the spill. Most gravel beaches where the oiled sediments 
were excavated and pushed into the surf zone for cleansing have returned to their 
normal shape and distribution on the shore. Beaches that had been stripped of 
plants and animals by the toxic effects of oil and by the intense cleanup efforts show 
extensive recolonization and are similar in appearance to areas that were unoiled. 
Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Prince William’s Oily Mess: A Tale of Recovery, NOAA 
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Nevertheless, NOAA has also cautioned that “impacts from the 
spill remain”: 
 
 Deeply penetrated oil continues to visibly leach from a few 
beaches, such as Smith Island. 
 In some areas, intertidal animals, such as mussels, are still 
contaminated by oil, affecting not only the mussels but any 
animals (including people) that eat them. 
 Some rocky sites that were stripped of heavy plant cover by 
high-pressure, hot-water cleaning remain mostly bare rock. 
 Rich clam beds that suffered high mortalities from oil and 
extensive beach cleaning have not re-colonized to their 
previous levels.160 
 
Notably, NOAA concludes that “Prince William Sound has made a 
remarkable recovery from a severe injury, but it remains an ecosystem 
in transition.”161 
In other words, twenty years after a major surface spill of oil, 
Prince William Sound has not fully recovered and, indeed, may never 
do so. Its first-sense resilience to oil spills is incomplete, or at least 
operates over substantial time scales, and we may eventually find (or 
decide) that ecological communities within the Sound have in fact 
experienced resilience in the second sense: an ecological regime shift. 
As one possible example, NOAA reports that “[b]eginning in 1990, 
scientists saw the cover of rockweed increase steadily at oiled sites—
until 1994, that is. From 1994 through 1995, there appeared to be a 
noticeable decline in cover, especially at sites that had been oiled.”162 
While scientists are still searching for an explanation, the three 
candidates—a disruption in the normal mix of rockweed ages, an 
explosion in the populations of grazers such as periwinkle snails, or a 
longer-term toxic effect of the oil163—all suggest that the oil spill 
may have induced (or at least threatened) a regime shift. 
These results suggest that we should be very concerned for the 
Gulf ecosystems affected by the Macondo well blowout. First, and as 
 
OCEAN SERV. EDUC., http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/stories/oilymess/ 
oily02_impacts.html (last updated Mar. 25, 2008). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id.  
 163. See id. 
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this Article has emphasized throughout, unlike the Exxon Valdez 
spill, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred at great depth, and the 
oil behaved unusually compared to oil released on the surface. 
Second, considerably more toxic dispersants were used in connection 
with the Gulf oil spill than the Alaska oil spill.164 Third, humans 
could intervene almost immediately to begin cleaning the rocky 
substrate in Prince William Sound, but human intervention for many 
of the important affected Gulf ecosystems, especially the deepwater 
ones (but even for shallower coral reefs), remains impossible.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Prince William Sound 
was and remains a far less stressed ecosystem than the Gulf of 
Mexico. In 2008, for example, NOAA stated that “[d]espite the 
remaining impacts of the [still then] largest oil spill in U.S. history, 
Prince William Sound remains a relatively pristine, productive and 
biologically rich ecosystem.”165 To be sure, the Sound was not 
completely unstressed, and “[w]hen the Exxon Valdez spill occurred 
in March 1989, the Prince William Sound ecosystem was also 
responding to at least three notable events in its past: an unusually 
cold winter in 1988–89; growing populations of reintroduced sea 
otters; and a 1964 earthquake.”166 Nevertheless, the Gulf of Mexico 
is besieged by environmental stressors at another order of magnitude 
(or two), reducing its resilience to disasters like the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill. As the Deepwater Horizon Commission detailed at 
length, the Gulf faces an array of long-term threats, from the loss of 
protective and productive wetlands along the coast to hurricanes to a 
growing “dead zone” (hypoxic zone) to sediment starvation to sea-
level rise to damaging channeling to continual (if smaller) oil releases 
from the thousands of drilling operations.167 In the face of this 
plethora of stressors, even the Commission championed a kind of 
resilience thinking, recognizing that responding to the oil spill alone 
was not enough. It equated restoration of the Gulf to “restored 
resilience,” arguing that it “represents an effort to sustain these 
 
 164. See 2011 BP DISASTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 144 (noting that 5500 gallons of 
dispersants were used in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, compared to over 300,000 
gallons used in response to the Gulf oil spill in the first two weeks alone). 
 165. Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., supra note 159. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See 2011 BP DISASTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 197–206. 
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diverse, interdependent activities [fisheries, energy, and tourism] and 
the environment on which they depend for future generations.”168 
A number of commentators have catalogued the failure of the 
legal and regulatory systems governing the Deepwater Horizon 
platform and the Macondo well operations.169 The Deepwater 
Horizon Commission similarly noted that the Deepwater Horizon’s 
“demise signals the conflicted evolution—and severe shortcomings—
of federal regulation of offshore oil drilling in the United States.”170 
In its opinion, “[t]he Deepwater Horizon blowout, explosion, and oil 
spill did not have to happen.”171 The Commission’s overall 
conclusion was two-fold. First, “[t]he record shows that without 
effective government oversight, the offshore oil and gas industry will 
not adequately reduce the risk of accidents, nor prepare effectively to 
respond in emergencies.”172 Second, “government oversight, alone, 
cannot reduce those risks to the full extent possible. Government 
oversight . . . must be accompanied by the oil and gas industry’s 
internal reinvention: sweeping reforms that accomplish no less than a 
fundamental transformation of its safety culture.”173 
Reforms to government oversight are underway. One of the 
immediate legal consequences of the disaster, for example, was the 
comprehensive replacement of the former Minerals Management 
Service in order to separate its regulatory and revenue-generating 
functions.174 Within two months of the Deepwater Horizon sinking, 
the head of the Minerals Management Service resigned, and the 
Agency’s functions were transferred to the brand new Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement 
(BOEMRE, or BOE, for short).175 That new agency, moreover, will 
further separate its functions into three agencies—the Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), the Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and the Office of Natural 
Resources Revenue (ONRR)—to “improve the management, 
 
 168. Id. at 213.  
 169. See sources cited supra note 39. 
 170. 2011 BP DISASTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 55. 
 171. Id. at 217. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See id. at 55–56. 
 175. See Frequently Asked Questions, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION 
& ENFORCEMENT, http://tinyurl.com/3h5t84d (last visited July 20, 2011). 
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oversight, and accountability of activities on the [Outer Continental 
Shelf]; ensure a fair return to the taxpayer from royalty and revenue 
collection and disbursement activities; and provide independent 
safety and environmental oversight and enforcement . . . .” 176 
The Deepwater Horizon Commission had several other 
recommendations for governance reforms, although it largely chose 
to hew close to existing law and policy, tinkering with existing 
structures rather than promoting a different and more precautionary 
philosophical approach.177 More important for purposes of this 
Article, however, is the Commission’s unquestioned assumption of 
the Gulf’s continuing ability to recover from massive oil spills 
(resilience in the first sense). In particular, its environmental 
recommendations seek to ensure, inter alia, that “[t]he environment 
and the economy of the Gulf region recovers as completely and as 
quickly as possible, not only from the direct impacts of the spill, but 
from the decades of degradation that proceeded it.”178  
 This is natural resources law’s first-sense resilience dependence in 
action—an unwarranted assumption that human actions are unlikely 
to push ecosystems over ecosystem thresholds into different 
structures and functions that, generally, will have significantly 
reduced value to the humans that depend on the current ecological 
state. As William C. Clark, Dixon D. Jones, and C.S. Holling have 
noted, “A system which is globally stable is admirable for blind trial-
and-error experimentation: it will always recover from any 
perturbation. It is this paradigm of an infinitely forgiving Nature that 
has been assumed implicitly in the past . . . .”179 Nevertheless, as a 
result of this first-sense resilience dependence, the laws and policies 
governing offshore oil drilling (and many other kinds of natural 
resource management) base their regulatory and liability regimes on 




 176. Id. 
 177. See 2011 BP DISASTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 249–91. 
 178. Id. at 275. 
 179. William C. Clark et al., Lessons for Ecological Policy Design, in FOUNDATIONS OF 
ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, supra note 142, at 331, 333. 
 180. VALERIE ANN LEE & P.J. BRIDGEN, THE NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE 
ASSESSMENT DESKBOOK: A LEGAL AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS § 14.2.1, at 326 (2002).  
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What would happen instead if we incorporated full resilience 
theory into our laws? As Brian Walker and David Salt have discussed 
at length, “Resilience thinking presents an approach to managing 
natural resources that embraces human and natural systems as 
complex systems continually adapting through cycles of change.”181 
In addition to adopting a systems perspective on ecosystem 
management, resilience thinking fully incorporates the implications 
of resilience in the second sense (potential ecological regime shifts)— 
the recognition that “[s]ocio-ecological systems can exist in more 
than one kind of stable state. If a system changes too much, it 
crosses a threshold and begins behaving in a different way, with 
different feedbacks between its component parts and a different 
structure.”182 Resilience thinking therefore seeks not—as is true 
under current management paradigms—to tweak the operations of 
an ecosystem in order to optimize particular products or functions183 
(for example, oil production in the Gulf). Rather, it seeks to more 
humbly recognize that “[t]he complexity of the many linkages and 
feedbacks that make up a socio-ecological system is such that we can 
never predict with certainty what the exact response will be to any 
intervention in the system.”184 In other words, resilience thinking 
acknowledges what is particularly true with respect to marine 
ecosystems: most of the time, we have only the most simplistic of 
understandings of what our actions do to the ecosystems that we 
both impact and depend upon.185 
Operationalizing resilience thinking is not easy, especially given 
current natural resources management norms and paradigms. 
However, some of the ways in which it might make a difference to 
our current laws governing offshore oil drilling are: 
 
 Comprehensive ecosystem surveys should precede resource 
development and exploitation rather than follow them. 
While resilience thinking teaches us that we will never 
 
 181. BRIAN WALKER & DAVID SALT, RESILIENCE THINKING: SUSTAINING ECOSYSTEMS 
AND PEOPLE IN A CHANGING WORLD 10 (2006). 
 182. Id. at 11. 
 183. See id. at 30–31. 
 184. Id. at 34–35. 
 185. For this and other reasons, John Nagle has actively promoted humility as an 
appropriate environmental ethic. John Copeland Nagle, From Swamp Drainage to Wetlands 
Regulation to Ecological Nuisances to Environmental Ethics, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 787, 811 
(2008). 
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completely understand the complex functioning, 
interactions, and responses of ecosystems—for example, 
Clark, Jones, and Holling consider management 
“surprises” inevitable186—that acknowledgement of 
human limitation should not become an excuse for 
operating completely blindly. Indeed, the process of 
learning, often embodied in the inclusion of adaptive 
management, is generally considered a critical component 
of resilience thinking and management.187 Especially for 
activities in the oceans (and within the oceans, especially 
for activities at great depth), would-be resource exploiters 
should be required to comprehensively survey, at the very 
least, the ecosystems within which they will be working 
to provide a baseline for measuring the changes that their 
later activities might effect. 
 
 Systemic risk is as important as individual risk. 
Notwithstanding the National Environmental Policy 
Act’s requirement that federal permitting agencies 
consider cumulative impacts to the environment,188 we 
currently evaluate the risks of offshore oil drilling 
primarily with respect to individual oil drilling operations 
in connection with individual permits and leases. As the 
Deepwater Horizon Commission recognized, however, 
the larger systemic context of such drilling is also 
important, and perhaps arguably more so. From a 
resilience perspective, a drilling operation that uses the 
only oil rig in a pristine marine environment is an 
inherently different risk problem than the Deepwater 
Horizon’s situation of being one of thousands of similar 
rigs in a pervasively and multiply stressed Gulf. As Clark, 
Jones, and Holling have suggested, our trial-and-error 
experiments with Nature in our first-sense resilience 
 
 186. Clark et al., supra note 179, at 333. 
 187. See Craig R. Allen et al., Commentary on Part One Articles, in FOUNDATIONS OF 
ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, supra note 142, at 3, 8; Clark et al., supra note 179, at 333; 
WALKER & SALT, supra note 181, at 33; J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and 
Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems—with Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. 
L. REV. 1373, 1396 (2011). 
 188. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). 
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dependence mode “now threaten[] errors larger and 
more costly than society can afford.”189 Resilience 
thinking should more forcibly insist on multilayered 
systemic awareness, promoting limits on how much 
exploitation should be occurring simultaneously and 
encouraging more gradual resource development over 
longer periods of time. 
 
 Risk to the environment should be presumed, even when 
all actors follow all best practices. Our current first-sense 
resilience dependency produces laws that assume that 
ecosystems can be fixed—and, perhaps more importantly, 
as embodied in the OPA natural resource damages 
regulations, that natural processes will often be able to 
restore themselves without human effort. Resilience 
thinking, in contrast, effectively assumes that ecosystems 
could suddenly shift to a new regime at any time for any 
number of reasons that we do not understand and may 
not even be able to anticipate—the combined potential 
of the second and third conceptions of resilience. In the 
words of Clark, Jones, and Holling, “if a system has 
multiple regions of stability, then Nature can seem to 
play the practical joker rather than the forgiving 
benefactor.”190 To exaggerate the differences in outlook 
just a bit, our current paradigm presumes that most 
ecosystems can cope with most human activities, while 
resilience thinking presumes that all changes to an 
ecosystem are at least potentially completely 
destabilizing—i.e., inherently risky, with the outer limits 
of that risk being potentially massive. To translate this 
change in presumption into legalese, full resilience 
thinking promotes a policy framework where most 
human activities in the environment could be—and 




 189. Clark et al., supra note 179, at 333. 
 190. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/21/2012 10:59 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1896 
As every first-year law student learns, engaging in inherently 
dangerous activities tends to subject the actor to strict and fairly 
absolute liability for the kinds of harm that made the activity 
inherently dangerous.191 Under resilience thinking, those kinds of 
harm would include all of the unpredictable and unexpected changes 
to the ecosystem that might occur as a result of a disaster like the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, up to and including a substantial shift in 
ecosystem regime or ecosystem collapse.  
While full implementation of an “inherently dangerous activity” 
legal regime for all marine activities is unlikely, the case is fairly 
strong for deep sea oil exploration and drilling. It is at least worth 
pondering what such a consequence of resilience thinking might 
mean for risk assessment and behavioral incentives in this context. If 
nothing else, one would predict under such a new view of potential 
liability that oil companies’ insurers might begin charging premiums 
that more accurately reflect the potentially catastrophic liability that 
resilience-minded regulations and policies would make legally 
cognizant—and might insist on the much more precautionary and 
safety-minded approach to offshore oil drilling that a multitude of 
commentators and the Deepwater Horizon Commission have sought 
in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The second and third senses of resilience, and the socio-
ecological risks for humans that they underscore, should not be  
foreign concepts in the regulation of the marine environment, 
including (and perhaps especially) when it comes to regulating the 
offshore oil and gas exploration and drilling taking place at ever-
increasing depths. Nor should the possibility that the cumulative 
stresses to the Gulf of Mexico have pushed its ecosystems to the 
brink of ecosystem thresholds be ignored in our regulatory regimes.  
By acknowledging that ecosystems are dynamic and subject to 
sudden and fairly catastrophic (at least from a human perspective) 
changes, full resilience thinking provides a path away from the trap 
of first-sense resilience dependence. Specifically, full resilience 
thinking recognizes that exploitative activities that affect the Gulf—
not just deep sea oil drilling but also fishing and farming up the 
Mississippi River—put all of the human beings who depend on the 
 
 191. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977). 
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Gulf’s ecosystem services, as well as the ecosystems themselves, at 
collective risk of catastrophic ecosystem collapse. A liability regime 
based on these unavoidable and potentially massive environmental 
risks would likely protect the Gulf of Mexico better than our current 
regime of natural resource damages, especially when injury occurs in 



































DO NOT DELETE 1/21/2012 10:59 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1898 
 
 
 
